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Abstract Our contribution situates Human-Robot Commu-
nication, especially the grounding of Natural Kind Terms,
in the interface of Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Psychol-
ogy, Philosophy, Robotics and Semantics. We investigate
whether a robot can be grounded in the sense favoured in
Artificial Intelligence and Philosophy.
We thus extend the notion of grounding to social sym-
bol grounding using an interactive perspective addressing
the question how grounding can be achieved in detail in
interaction. For the acquisition of Natural Kind Terms we
establish the notions of foundational common ground and
foundational grounding in contrast to the established com-
mon ground and grounding. We introduce the robot setting
used and provide a deep evaluation of a tutorial dialogue
between a user and the robot. We investigate these Human-
Robot Communication data from an ethno-methodological
and an “omniscient” perspective (the latter amounting to
consideration of automatic speech recognition results) and
test whether these perspectives matter for analysing ground-
ing. We show that the robot has acquired a partial concept of
a Natural Kind Term—represented by statistics over visual
object features—and that this is shared knowledge, hence
the first step of a grounding sequence. Finally, we argue that
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grounding of robots can be achieved and extended to situ-
ated structures of considerable complexity.
Keywords Common ground · Grounding · Human-robot
communication · Natural kind terms · Dialogue structure
1 Introduction
Grounding is a notion used in semantic and pragmatic theo-
ries dealing with the generation of (mostly) reliable collec-
tive or public information. The public involved may range
from dyads to large communities. In the prototypical case
of interest here, the information is the outcome of an in-
formation exchange by two or more conversational partic-
ipants (CPs). The exchange may be varied as well; it may
consist of speech acts or dialogue acts and sequences of
these by speakers to addressees. In a simple case, the dia-
logue acts can be assertions of one CP to one or more ad-
dressees. If the addressees accept or acknowledge the infor-
mation the speaker and the addressees share it, it is com-
mon to them. This common information can be presup-
posed in the following part of the dialogue or in new con-
versations which in a way rely on the current CPs. Com-
mon ground can also be produced by unknown sources and
spread in the public by various media. The dyad we will deal
with consists of a robot and a human instructing the robot.
This is an entirely new variant in the grounding domain.
In human-human communication (HHC), the obstacles to
grounding and the production of common ground are nu-
merous. They range from problems of hearing to disbelieved
information and arguments regarded with suspicion. Every
type of obstacle comes with its own means for remedy. Hear-
ing problems, for example, can be treated with clarification
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requests, disbelieved information by denial and suspect ar-
guments by counterarguments. In our paper we start from
this well-established notion of common ground and investi-
gate whether it can be a guiding concept in robotics, more
precisely, in human-robot communication (HRC).
In contrast to HHC, HRC is highly asymmetric in terms
of capabilities, background knowledge, and perception. The
robot senses the world through image pixels that are grouped
to coarsely characterised visual blobs. It understands speech
based on a limited vocabulary that is matched to any sound
input—possibly causing speech recognition errors. Never-
theless, both interlocutors—the human and the robot—are
situated in the same physical world and are able to refer to
the same real world objects. Thus, a partial overlap of their
mental models is practically possible raising the question
whether the robot’s capabilities are sufficient to achieve a
common ground in communication.
Word meaning must first and foremost be grounded,
i.e. made socially available. We take as our paradigm case
the grounding of natural kind terms (NKTs) for the robot
through a user. Only if the words are grounded, can the
proposition made up by them be grounded as well. So, in-
tuitively, the grounding business for robots will start at the
level of words. We defend this idea in the next section. In
our modelling of robotic interaction we favour an approach
which is not explicitly mentalistic but descriptive in an exter-
nalistic sense, focusing on agents’ contributions. As a conse-
quence, grounding is not explicitly modelled by an algorith-
mic procedure. Nevertheless we are interested in grounding
procedures. The reason is that the robot’s command of an
NKT should be backed by common knowledge, i.e. socially
anchored. If this is the case, the robot uses the NKT accord-
ing to accepted lexical conventions. Therefore, we must in-
vestigate, how much of a classical grounding concept can
be satisfied by the robot-user interaction implemented. If a
tutorial dialogue introducing a NKT is successful, i.e. if the
robot agreed to memorise the NKT in question and this in
turn is acknowledged by the user, we have evidence that our
system reconstructs acquisition of NKTs up to revision as in
human-human dialogue.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we briefly
introduce the formal concept of common ground and discuss
how it relates to our HRC-setting. Section 3 describes the
standard grounding process applying Clark’s Action Ladder
and points out the need of a foundational grounding process
in the usage of words. Section 4 presents the tutorial set-
ting for the acquisition of Natural Kind Terms by the robot,
the system capabilities needed, and the experimental setup.
An example dialogue of this dataset is discussed in Sect. 5
which is analysed from an ethno-methodological perspec-
tive and an omniscient one. We draw a conclusion of what
has been acquired by the robot in Sect. 6 and summarise our
findings in Sect. 7.
2 Collective Mental States and Dialogue
In this paper we go beyond the concept of a grounding pro-
cess for an individual system. Instead, we consider how
symbol grounding can be achieved in a step-wise process
between two interaction participants. We also have ground-
ing of word forms which, however, we do not treat in this
paper. Collective or common information is a necessary in-
gredient of our everyday doings exploiting coordination and
cooperation of agents [21, 22]. It makes up the essence of
some fact being grounded, i.e. of some fact being collec-
tive or common information. Grounding is achieved using
a set of procedures aiming at establishing common ground.
Frequently, grounding is implemented using types of dia-
logue acts [19] which themselves also had to be grounded at
some time, a fact crucial for HRC as we will see. The role of
dialogue in grounding has been a prominent research topic
of Clark and colleagues, see [5, 7]. How can the concept
of common information be explained? To sum up a discus-
sion which began with [13] and has been continued since
then, common information is circular or infinitely recursive
[1, 2]; it does therefore not admit of a formulation as a finite
iteration of mental states attributed by one agent to another
and vice versa in the manner of I know that you know that I
know and so on for n times and You know that I know that
you know and so on for n times. The non-finiteness argu-
ment is due to [6] and has been accepted since then. Perhaps
the most elegant formulation of the circularity property, re-
ferred to as (CIRC-Def) below, was given by the philosopher
Harman [11] using mutual belief as a proxy for common in-
formation:
(CIRC-Def) a and b mutually believe that p := (q) a and
b believe that p and that q .
Note that in (CIRC-Def) “q” points to “(q)” establishing
the circle. (CIRC-Def) does not contain features of some an-
choring situation. As a contrasting example of a so-called
shared situation definition (SH-SIT-Def) we present here
Clark’s neo-Lewsian version [4] (p. 66), where the situation
is taken explicitly into account. (We consider the relation
between the (SH-SIT-Def) and our human-robot-setting be-
low):
(SH-SIT-Def) p is common ground for members of com-
munity C iff :=
1. Every member of C has information that basis b holds;
2. b indicates to every member of C that every member of
C has information that b holds;
3. b indicates to members of C that p.
In the (SH-SIT-Def) circularity rests on the use of “b”.
Clark generalizes the notion of Common Belief/Knowledge
by taking “having information” as a cover term for believ-
ing, knowing, being aware that, supposing that and factual
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versions of seeing.1 Anything able to carry information can
serve as the basis b for C, especially things seen and utter-
ances. We will use these properties in Sects. 5 and 6. (SH-
SIT-Def) captures a notion which is useful in most empirical
contexts, since it allows to anchor having information that p
to situations and groups C ranging from dyads onwards.2
We emphasize that all interpersonal routines that speak-
ers of a language qua members of a culture are adjusted to
depend on common ground in this sense. Hence information
(that) p covers word meaning as well as rules of turn taking
in dialogue and much else. “Much else” comprises e.g. the
opening, the task-related part and the closing of the HRC tu-
torial dialogue used in Sects. 3 and 4 as well as the tutorial
dialogue itself taken as a structured entity. Since grounding
has to be ultimately anchored in individual mental states, it
is subjective and public or social at the same time.
By way of an interim sum up, (SH-SIT-Def) is mapped
unto our HRC-setting in the following way: The situation
b we are interested in is the tutorial situation between the
robot and a user demonstrating a pineapple to it and intro-
ducing its NKT “pineapple”. C is the dyad of user and robot
and p is the information pineapple(demonstrated object) or
pineapple(this).
3 A Working Concept: Clark’s Action Ladder and
Types of Common Ground
If grounding is ubiquitous as stated above, how are com-
munication and grounding related? This is one of the cen-
tral issues of our paper. There are various answers to that
and the one we will subscribe to depends on Clark’s Action
Ladder for grounding. Clark’s Action Ladder describes a hi-
erarchy of four levels which must be traversed in order to
anchor the speaker’s meaning of a proposition p for an ad-
dressee. For reasons which will become clear soon, we refer
to Clark’s notion of common ground as standard common
ground (STCG) and the procedures used for grounding as
standard grounding (STG). Summarising, the Clarkian pave-
way to STCG is as follows: Dialogue is a form of coordi-
nated action. Coordinated actions are joint projects. These
are, respectively, proposed and considered by the conversa-
tional participants (CPs). To guarantee the success of joint
projects one needs STG and STCG. Here is an example of
STG-ing a word [4] (p. 221):
Roger: now, - um do you and your husband have a j- car
Nina: - have a car?
Roger: yeah
Nina: no-
1Not all of these are veridical, so the generalization has non-trivial con-
sequences.
2AI research in modal logics uses concepts like (CIRC-Def) and (SH-
SIT-Def) as well, see the axiomatic accounts in [8] and [15] for com-
parison.
Note the structure of the STG sequence: A problem is
identified by Nina and treated using a clarification request,
attended to in turn by Roger. We get a repair from “j-car”
to “car” which is accepted; then the base-line conversation
continues with Nina’s answer. What we see in the example
is that a problem arises and is solved by a side sequence
(“- have a car?” “yeah”). The solution yields an update:
Its result can be added to the STCG accessible to both CPs.
What goes into the STCG can be seen from Clark’s Action
Ladder3 (which corresponds to a systematics from bottom
to top)4 as shown in Table 1.
The level interaction represented in Table 1 is: A presents
X and B accepts X and provides [positive] evidence in the
form of feedback. STCG must exist for all levels. STCG on
higher levels presupposes STCG on lower levels. The “Prin-
ciple of joint closure” regulates presentation and acceptance:
“The participants in a joint action try to establish the mu-
tual belief that they have succeeded well enough for current
purposes”5 (p. 226). The STCG is updated on all of these
presentation + acceptance levels. Given [belief in] success-
ful updates, that is if there is no need for clarification, the
dialogue can move on. All layers, especially three and four,
can lead to production of adjacency pairs. More intricate di-
alogue structures can be modelled based on these and other
projective patterns, for example genre regularities as in tu-
torial dialogue. The link between signalling meanings p fe-
licitously and grounding aiming at STCG is that every level
of the hierarchy must be standardly grounded, for example
identification of words and understanding of word meanings
finally making up p. In short, every level is “mutually ap-
proved” as satisfactory by the CPs. Now an important dif-
ference between the example above and the HRC becomes
visible. STCG does not deal with the acquisition of terms. In
the example above the meaning of the concept car is not at
issue, it is presupposed. In contrast, in our HRC setting, the
meaning of natural kind terms (NKTs) has to be grounded
(as have all other meanings), if communication is to be nat-
ural and successful. In a way, the grounding problems we
face in HRC are nearer to the acquisition of meanings. We
call these types of common ground and grounding founda-
tional common ground (FCG) and foundational grounding
(FG). Our claim is: If a robot should be enabled to commu-
nicate, its usage of words has to be foundationally grounded.
Grounding words is a precondition for the robot’s behaving
socially, and vice versa. We look at a tutorial dialogue be-
tween a human and a robot to investigate whether this is a
3Meanwhile there are more elaborate versions of the Action Ladder.
However, for our purposes the grain of the original one suffices.
4Clark and most other theorists of STCG share a preference for relying
on “that p”, i.e. on propositions but other options are necessary in the
end.
5Note that STCG is defined via mutual belief here.
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Table 1 Clark’s action ladder [4, p. 221]
Speaker A’s actions/presentations Addressee B’s actions/acceptance
A is proposing joint project w to B B is considering A’s proposal of w
A is signalling that p for B B is recognizing that p from A
A is presenting signal s to B B is identifying signal s from A
A is executing behaviour t for B B is attending to behaviour t from A
feasible claim, empirically and methodologically. In pass-
ing, we already pointed out how the grounding concept ap-
plies to the dialogue genre of “tutorial dialogue”, conceived
of as a series of joint projects, which is central for our in-
stance of HRC. This will be initialized with a description of
the robot’s dialogue interaction patterns in Sects. 4 and 5.
Concerning NKTs a few remarks must suffice (see [3] for
more information). They make up our vocabulary for classi-
fying naturally given objects, examples are names for fruits
(our type of example), liquids, trees, flowers, animals, body
parts and so on. They are tied to perceptual experience and
admit of simple hierarchies. They are basic from the devel-
opmental and the evolutionary point of view and universal,
i.e. they can be found in all languages.
4 The Robot Setting Used: “Curious Flobi”
In this section we describe the facilities for acquisition of
NKTs by the robot used, especially the interaction of the
system with a Wizard-of-Oz (WOz) component. Observe
that the semantics of NKTs is based on visual perception.
This implies that the robot has to integrate his percept of the
fruit indicated into the meaning of the NKT at stake. This
fact motivated the robotic setting used (deixis, WOz) in the
first place.
4.1 The Underlying Dialogue Model
In linguistic dialogue modelling, roughly two main tradi-
tions can be identified: approaches that model the inter-
nal attitudes of the interaction partners and their under-
lying cognitive state and, in contrast, approaches that de-
scribe the public and conventional aspects of how interac-
tion typically proceeds [9]. Accordingly, also approaches to
computational dialogue modelling can be categorized into
mental-state approaches and descriptive approaches. De-
scriptive approaches include all types of models that spec-
ify the dialogue flow explicitly, while in mental-state ap-
proaches the dialogue flow is created dynamically, emerging
from a model of the interaction goals or of the interaction
partner’s mental state.
Despite much of research carried out in both directions,
interactive robotic systems bring new challenges to dialogue
modelling. It has now become necessary to take physical
situatedness into account. This means that questions of re-
actability to dynamic environments, possibly involving mul-
tiple modalities, and of potentially open-ended, unstructured
interactions, involving multiple tasks at a time play an im-
portant role and have to be considered in the dialogue model.
However, existing approaches to dialogue modelling—both
mental-state and descriptive—have been focusing on de-
signing interactions for information-oriented query systems
and are thus not directly transferable to robotics, as argued
in [17]. We have therefore suggested a new approach to
dialogue modelling that considers these special demands
of robotic applications [16], called PaMini (Pattern-Based
Mixed-Initiative Interaction), which we used to implement
the tutoring dialogue with the robot Flobi.
The PaMini approach relies on a set of generic Interac-
tion Patterns that capture recurring dialogue structures, such
as asking for information or requesting an action. Figure 1
shows the interaction pattern used for information requests
(initiated by the robot) and object demonstrations (initiated
by the human) as an example. At run-time, several such
patterns can be active at the same time, and can be inter-
leaved to achieve a more flexible interaction style. As an in-
terface to the domain processing of the robot system, PaMini
makes use of a fine-grained Task State Protocol: a task gets
initiated, accepted, cancelled or updated, may deliver in-
termediate results and is completed finally; alternatively, it
may be rejected by the handling component or its execution
may fail. The dialogue manager is notified about task state
changes and reacts by generating appropriate utterances. By
combining these task states with robot dialogue acts, the
above Interaction Patterns relate the conversation level with
the domain level and integrate the robot’s action and per-
ception into the dialogue. A major difference to non-situated
approaches to dialogue modelling is that the dialogue flow
(i.e. the sequence of activated Interaction Patterns) is not de-
cided by the dialogue manager alone, but decided externally
in reaction to real-world events.
PaMini can be referred to as a descriptive approach, but it
operates at a more abstract level of dialogue than traditional
descriptive approaches, thus enabling reusability of dialogue
strategies, and with its interleaving patterns it allows for a
more flexible flow of dialogue. In contrast to many mental-
state approaches, such as Traum’s computational theory of
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Fig. 1 The Interaction Patterns used for information requests and for object demonstrations, respectively
grounding [20], the approach of Interaction Patterns does
not model the grounding process explicitly. Rather, ground-
ing is incorporated implicitly within the Interaction Patterns.
On successful completion of e.g. an object demonstration or
information request pattern, the negotiated information can
be viewed as shared knowledge, but not as grounded in the
standard sense, as we will see in Sect. 6. Using the Task
State Protocol, it is passed to the robotic subsystem, where
it will be stored or processed further.
4.2 System Capabilities
In the Curious Flobi tutoring scenario, shown in Fig. 2, a
number of previously unknown objects are present on a ta-
ble. The robot acquires their labels, i.e. the NKTs, through
spoken natural language dialogue with a human tutor. The
human can show objects to the robot, label them, and verify
what has been learned. Following a mixed-initiative interac-
tion style, the robot can also ask for object labels on its own
initiative.
The dialogue strategies of the Flobi system were de-
signed based on a Wizard-of-Oz study on object teaching,
where uninstructed users demonstrate everyday objects to a
teleoperated robot system [12]. All of the analysed interac-
tions have a very similar structure, consisting of an opening
part, a task-related part and a closing part. 36 % of the inter-
actions additionally feature transitional phrases that intro-
duce the task-related part. In the opening phase, introduc-
ing each other (82 %) and exchanging pleasantries (18 %)
are frequent. Aside from object demonstrations, the task-
related phase consists of checking learned objects (45 %)
Fig. 2 Scenario overview
and transitional phrases between the objects (36 %). Prais-
ing the robot for correctly learned objects turned out to be
universal (100 %). The task-related part may include closing
remarks (36 %). As far as possible, the observed strategies
were transferred to the Flobi scenario. Table 2 illustrates the
resulting interaction capabilities of the system.
4.3 System Overview
Our system uses a component-based architecture with event-
based, asynchronous communication. Figure 3 shows the
components of the system, consisting of three subparts for
vision, speech and motion. The major components involved
in object demonstration episodes (on which we will focus
for the purpose of this paper) are marked in orange colour.
As shown in Fig. 1, processing an object demonstration
requires two sequential steps: First, the object referred to
needs to be identified (i.e. a reference resolution task needs
to be executed). Second, its appearance must be memorized
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Table 2 Example dialogue demonstrating the interaction capabilities of the system
Purpose Example interaction
Greeting User: Hello, Flobi
Flobi: Hi, hello
Introducing User: My name is Anneliese
Flobi: Hello, Anneliese. Nice to meet you
Exchanging pleasantries User: How are you?
Flobi: Fine, thank you!
Task transition User: I am here to show you some objects
Flobi: Alright, let’s start!
Attracting attention User: Flobi, look here!
Flobi: Yes, I’m looking
Object demonstration User: This is a yellow lemon
Flobi: Alright, a yellow melon. Is that
correct?
User: No, it’s a lemon
Flobi: Alright, a lemon. Is that correct?
User: Yes, that’s correct
Flobi: Okay, I am going to learn the
lemon
Flobi: I have learned the lemon
Object query Flobi: What is that?
User: This is an apple
(remainder similar to object
demonstration)
Listing learned objects User: What have you learned so far?
Flobi: I have learned a lemon and an
apple
Checking User: Flobi, do you know this one?
Flobi: I will have a look at it
Flobi: This is an apple
Praising User: Well done, Flobi
Flobi: Thank you
Restart User: Restart
Flobi: Okay, let’s start over again
Transitional phrases User: Would you like to learn another
object?
Flobi: Yes, I want to learn them all
Closing task User: Okay, that’s it
Flobi: Are you leaving already?
Parting User: Good bye, Flobi. Take care!
Flobi: Bye, see you later
(i.e. an object learning task needs to be executed). Both tasks
are initiated by the dialogue system, and handled by a ref-
erence resolution and an object learning component, respec-
tively. The components involved coordinate by means of the
above described Task State Protocol.
The system is not (yet) fully autonomous. In particu-
lar, the reference resolution is operator-assisted using the
Wizard-of-Oz method. This is because, despite our general
goal of using only autonomous behaviour, we found through
the above mentioned study on object teaching that users’
referencing behaviour varies considerably, and this obser-
vation was confirmed by the user study with the Flobi sys-
tem, where 8 different referencing strategies could be identi-
fied. Not all of these could be acceptably automated by now.
Hence, the system detects references on its own, but resolv-
ing is done by an operator selecting the appropriate object
region. Thus, the normal flow of events when processing an
object demonstration is as follows (cf. also Fig. 1):
– The user produces an utterance. The dialogue system in-
terprets the user’s utterance as an object demonstration
(H.demonstrate, e.g. “U: This is a pineapple.”).
– The dialogue system initiates a reference resolution task.
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Fig. 3 Components of the Flobi




reference resolution and object
recognition. They are marked in
orange colour (Colour figure
online)
– The WOz reference resolution component captures the
current image of the scene so that the operator can select
the object referred to.
– The WOz reference resolution component updates the ref-
erence resolution task with the coordinates of the object
and completes it.
– The dialogue system generates a request for confirmation
of the given NKT (R.askForConfirmation, e.g.“This is a
pine-apple, is that correct?”)
– If the user confirms (H.confirm, e.g. “Yes, that is cor-
rect.”), the dialogue system generates an acknowledge-
ment (R.acknowledge, e.g. “Good.”) and initiates an ob-
ject learning task, using the coordinates obtained from the
reference resolution task.
– If the object recogniser accepts the learning task, the dia-
logue manager announces the start of the learning process
(R.assert, e.g. “R: Then I will learn the pineapple now.”)
– The object recogniser updates its representations and
completes the learning task which the dialogue system ac-
knowledges (R.acknowledge, “R: I have memorized the
pineapple.”).
Note that the operator who resolves the reference does not
have complete information, but observes only the (possibly
incorrect) speech recognition result as well as the user’s de-
ictic gesture through the robot’s eye cameras. Thus, it relies
on the same information an autonomous component would
have to. This means that reference resolution may fail, which
occurs for instance if the deictic gesture is performed out of
the robot’s field of view or if the user does not perform a
deictic gesture at all but refers to the object only verbally
(“There is an apple next to the banana”).
4.4 The Dataset
The dialogue excerpt we will analyse in this paper is taken
from a study with unexperienced users [18]. For the study
32 participants aged between 21 and 79 interacted with the
Flobi system, with little prior instruction. Participants were
told that the study was about object learning and asked to
fill in a pre-questionnaire that captured their expectations
towards the (still inactive) robot. Subsequently, they were
asked to interact with the robot for at least 10 minutes and
informed that they could begin interaction by greeting the
robot and end interaction by saying goodbye.
In addition, they were advised not to be discouraged
by speech recognition problems, and an emergency phrase
(”Restart“) was provided. In order to obtain natural demon-
stration behaviour, however, it was not specified how exactly
they should present the objects to the robot. Following the
interaction, participants were asked to fill in a closing ques-
tionnaire which contained both statements about the inter-
action and follow-up judgement questions, matched to the
expectation questionnaire.
A wide range of objective measures from the categories
dialogue efficiency, dialogue quality and task success was
collected, most of them obtained automatically from sys-
tem log files. The questionnaires captured subjective mea-
surements by the participants, including items that refer
both to the interaction (dialogue efficiency, task success,
cooperativeness and usability) and to their impression of
the robot (likability, perceived intelligence, animacy, task
abilities, personality and predictability). In order to deter-
mine the relevant factors that contribute to the various as-
pects of user satisfaction, the objective and subjective mea-
sures were related with each other as proposed by the PAR-
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ADISE method [23]. In addition, we varied the degree of
the robot’s task initiative as a three-level between-subjects
factor. These various quantitative evaluations were comple-
mented by qualitative analyses of selected interaction phe-
nomena, from which we will present a sample in this paper.
5 The Tutorial Dialogue Introducing the NKT
“Pineapple” in a HRC Session
In this section we present a tutorial dialogue between a hu-
man and the robot which finally leads to the acquisition of
the NKT “pineapple”. We scrutinize the public contribu-
tions of the agents as well as the automatic speech recog-
nition (ASR) decodings of the robotic system. The dialogue
is evaluated relying on principles of CA, modern dialogue
theory, theories of intention and cooperation and much else
of current research in communication (see bibliography). A
special focus is placed on the nature of the NKT pineapple
acquired. How much of it is acquired by the robot? We walk
through the Action Ladder hierarchy and specify what we
have got in the HRC at stake. At first sight, this seems re-
markably little but the first sight deludes. We treat this more
closely in Sect. 6. First we start in Sect. 5.1 with the dia-
logue (Fig. 4) and a technical description of what happens
from the point of view of the “omniscient engineer”.
5.1 The Technical Perspective
For the understanding of the dialogue excerpt shown in
Fig. 4, it is helpful to know that utterances are interpreted
based on a speech recognition grammar. In more detail, the
automatic speech recogniser (ASR) generates for each ut-
terance one or several grammar trees representing (parts
of) it. The dialogue system (DLG) then uses the nontermi-
nals of the grammar (e.g. Greeting, ObjectDescription) as
semantic tags. Based on conditions on them, the appropri-
ate interaction pattern is triggered. For instance, the object
demonstration pattern is triggered if the parse tree contains
an ObjectDescription nonterminal, and a greeting is trig-
gered if the parse tree contains a Greeting nonterminal but
no task-related nonterminal. Furthermore, pattern selection
is context-sensitive: the dialogue system’s expectations in-
fluence the order in which the conditions are tested.
The handling of the dialogue shown in Fig. 4 is as fol-
lows:
– The user’s utterance (81.) is split into two parts, due to
the user making a short pause. As we will see in the fol-
lowing, the surplus utterance produced by the split-up dis-
turbs the correct association of robot and user utterances.
For the user, however, this is not evident.
– First, the DLG processes the first part of the parse tree
(“until soon a pineapple”). Despite ASR misclassifica-
tions, the DLG interprets it correctly as an object demon-
stration, triggering an object demonstration pattern and
leading to the robot’s asking for confirmation of the label.
– The user in fact confirms the robot’s request (83.), but the
DLG needs to process the second part of the split-up ut-
terance first (“upon the table”). As this does not constitute
a valid reply to the confirmation request, the robot repeats
its request (84.).
– The user confirms a second time (85.). However, the
user’s first confirmation (83.) is associated with the sec-
ond request (84.). The second confirmation remains un-
processed.
– Having received the confirmation of the label, the DLG
starts the learning of the label (86., 87.) and acknowledges
if completed (88.).
– The user praises the robot (89.) to which the robot replies
by thanking the user (90.). Even though the robot’s reac-
tion seems coherent, it is in fact the reply to the user’s
still unprocessed second label confirmation (85.) which
the DLG interprets as praising because no confirmation is
expected in the current dialogue context.
– Finally, the user’s actual praising (89.) still needs to be
processed. Misclassified as a greeting, it causes the robot
to greet back (90.), which explains the robot’s unmoti-
vated greeting at the end of the tutorial dialogue.
5.2 Two Perspectives, Ethnomethodological Versus
Omniscient
We first turn to the “ethno-methodology of HRC” and take
the CPs’ contributions as turns in a normal dialogue. As a
consequence, we do not integrate ASR data, since in nor-
mal communication we also do not have access to internal
representations. From this perspective, we have the user’s
demonstration of the pineapple in (81.); the robot acknowl-
edges and asks for acknowledgement in (82.), given in (83.).
From a CA or a dialogue perspective we are then done with
the “question under discussion” [10] acquiring the NKT
pineapple and the CPs could either move on to a new dis-
course topic or terminate the encounter by a closing se-
quence (see Fig. 1). However, we get again an acknowl-
edgement and a request for acknowledgement without any
indication of a clarification request in (84.). The user po-
litely acknowledges (85.), the robot accepts (86.). He indi-
cates memorization of the concept pineapple (87.) and suc-
cessful completion (88.), again accepted by the user (89.).
We get the robot’s thanks (90.) and his unmotivated greet-
ing (91.) which is a flaw, interactionally speaking. However,
the external datum looks quite acceptable from the point of
view of ethno-methodology and dialogue theory, intentions’
analysis would perhaps falter over (84.) and (85).
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Fig. 4 The Tutorial Dialogue
Introducing the NKT
“pineapple” in a HRC Session.
(Note that Flobi’s English might
not be perfect. It is a fairly
literal translation of the German
wording.) Square brackets
indicate the ASR grammar parse
trees. Numbers in round
brackets indicate the associated
utterance. Associated utterances
are also marked in the same
colour (Colour figure online)
Now we have a look at the NKT pineapple acquired. It is
essentially an association between a picture of the pineap-
ple demonstrated, represented by a statistical model of its
visual features, and the word “pineapple” extracted by the
ASR from the speech flow as indicated in Sect. 5.1. So, the
situated demonstration and some sort of perceptual informa-
tion make up the whole concept. Given the richness of our
NKT pineapple based on sight, touch, smell and handiness,
this is a partial concept at best but it is a promising start. In
the end one would like to implant a testable notion for the
kind pineapple into the robot’s mind.
What does the objective look at the robot’s mind reveal?
Most of this has already been specified in Sect. 5.1 If we
map the dialogue contributions onto the Action Ladder as-
sociated with the robot via ASR, we see that we do not even
reach level two. Hence there is no chance to attain Clarkian
STCG. It is important to recognise that this is not evident
from the ethno-methodological perspective. Quite the con-
trary, from that perspective we could safely assume that
the Action Ladder is satisfied since no clarification requests
were produced. We will investigate the consequences of the
two perspectives upon grounding in the next section.
6 The Two Perspectives, a Shortcut to Propositions and
the Grounding Procedure Initialized
From the ethno-methodological perspective, knowledge of
the user concerning the demonstrated object is tied up with
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the latter iteration being justified by the user’s acknowledge-
ment in (89.). What we do not get however, is Knowrobot
Knowuser(pineapple(demonstrated object)), i.e. the robot
knowing that the user knows that the demonstrated object
is a pineapple, due to a lack of inferential capability on
the robot’s side. As a consequence, neither (CIRC-Def)
nor (SH-SIT-Def) can be satisfied. Turning to the omni-
scient point of view, ASR information seems to indicate
that we do not get at the propositional level in the Ac-
tion Ladder, and that hence communication is not achieved,
the “C” in HRC threatening to be a misnomer for our da-
tum. A closer look reveals, however, that the multi-modal
setting yields propositional content. Propositional informa-
tion, being more abstract than merely verbal information,
is not exclusively tied to verbal expressions. And we have
the reference resolution induced by WOz. Therefore we ar-
rive at pineapple(demonstrated object) as well. Granted that
we get this proposition, what is its status wrt grounding?
Well, the reasons for (Shared-Knowl) are the same as in
the ethno-methodological case. Using an iterative account
of grounding just for the moment, we can argue that we
have reached the first stage in the “grounding hierarchy”,
namely, the agents’ shared knowledge that the demonstrated
object is a pineapple, trivial for the human but not so triv-
ial for the robot. Anyway, we have already arrived at a so-
cially active concept. The user might reason (erroneously,
as we know, overestimating the robot’s capabilities):6 Now
the robot knows what a pineapple is, as good as I know, and
after my acceptance he knows that I know. We have seen on
which properties of the tutorial dialogue the acquisition of
the NKT structurally depends. On the surface, it is the joint
project NKT-introduction between the human and the robot.
Looking deeper, however, we realize that the schema for the
joint project is itself not well grounded: The robot does not
KNOW turn taking rules, so it cannot project (anticipate)
sequences in the CA sense. Certainly, grounding turn taking
rules would be a feasible but demanding HRC project.7
6It is certainly true, as one reviewer indicated, that the user’s terms
and the robot’s terms are of different semantic depth. So the question
arises, whether the robot’s answers should have clearly indicated this
difference, so instead of “learn the pineapple” it should perhaps have
used something like the more appropriate “I can visually recognise the
image of a pineapple”. In our study, we tried to reach an overlap be-
tween the user’s semantics of NKTs and Flobi’s newly acquired NKT.
We were eager to keep the rest of the terms used by the robot as simple
as possible, thus avoiding additional grounding problems. Our claim
is, then, that there is a substantial intersection between the semantics
of the NKT of the user and the robot after the positive conclusion of
the tutorial dialogue. “Learning” in the robot’s dialect has the purely
extensional sense of establishing a stable association between the word
form and the visual shape indicated by the user’s deixis. To do the same
for “visually recognise” and “image” would have been much harder.
Granted, that this falls short of the user’s meaning for “learning” which
is determined by the user’s biography.
7In addition, the robot does not develop Searlean intentions which are
also a precondition for public communication as well as Gricean inten-
7 Conclusion: Robot Mentalism
We started from the now classical concept of grounding
based on definitions given by D. Lewis, G. Harman, and
H.H. Clark. Trying to apply it to HRC, we found that the
classical concept, oriented towards HHC, presupposes a lot,
above all that the CPs under investigation share the same
language, especially its semantics. This is not the case for
robots’ instruction. There, grounding has to be built up from
the very bottom. This is exactly what happens in the tutorial
dialogue between the user and the robot acquiring an NKT,
where the NKT consists of a word form like “pineapple”
and the perceptual image of the fruit as introduced by the
user’s deixis. This insight led us to distinguish between stan-
dard grounding (STG), standard common ground (STCG)—
the received point of view- on the one hand and founda-
tional common ground (FCG) and foundational grounding
(FG) on the other hand. FG and FCG anchor concepts in
the world. Clark’s hypothesis is that in understanding propo-
sitions every level of the linguistic hierarchy involved has
to be fully grounded (has to be in STCG). At least for our
robotic setting this claim is too strong. We demonstrated that
there can be short-cuts: Through unification of the user’s
deixis and the reference resolution of WOz a proposition
like pineapple(demonstrated object) is generated which is
also KNOWN by the user and the robot, due to world knowl-
edge on the user’s side and the mechanics of the tutorial di-
alogue on the robot’s side, cf. the robot’s “I have myself the
pineapple memorized”. Since the user and the robot KNOW
the proposition, they have SOME shared knowledge and
partially satisfy the shared situation definition (cf. SH-SIT-
Def), the anchor of the ascending hierarchy of alternating
knowledge operators. How do we finally assess the status of
the robot’s mental state?
On the whole we support the case of robot mentalism, but
we stress that common ground for selected issues—here the
foundational grounding of NKTs in a tutorial dialogue—can
be achieved satisfying the (SH-SIT-Def) without establish-
ing STCG on all levels of the action ladder. Our study shows
that we can safely argue against sceptics which in toto want
to deny the status of being grounded to a robot. The tutorial
dialogue arrives at a socially active concept for pineapple
tion recognition. This means that the robot does not attribute intentions
to the user, for example “he wants me to identify the pineapple now and
to memorise it”. Recognising the intention of the other is important
for understanding speech acts and reacting accordingly, e.g. provide
partial acknowledgments. Nevertheless, we have achieved knowledge
of a NKT for it, so we are remarkably near to Pickering & Garrod’s
“implicit common ground” as proposed in their Interactive Alignment
Model (IAM) which in effect states that shared knowledge is by de-
fault achieved without iteration of mental states. Somewhat ironically,
having started with Clark, we arrive at Pickering & Garrod, the rea-
son being that their interactive alignment model is intention-free in the
default case.
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and represents an acceptable external datum from the point
of view of ethno-methodology and dialogue theory.
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